I just happened to look at the Wall Street Journal online to see the inevitable announcement about Chrysler entering a bankruptcy process. The accompanying photo is a bit startling. Where you expect to see the Chrysler CEO spinning a chrysalis yarn, there is the President of the United States. In the background are a bunch of politicos, including the increasingly omnipresent Tim Geithner and Larry Summers.
Within twelve hours, President Obama assured the nation that he himself is assiduously and continuously monitoring the worldwide spread of the swine flu while now simultaneously solving the previously intractable problems of Chrysler. Perhaps he is receiving Tweets to his Blackberry. By the way, I haven't included many of the President's other personal projects, such as monitoring Pakistan, making progress in Iraq, and maintaining a vigilant eye on the poppy fields of Afghanistan. What happened to his Vice President? Better yet, what happened to his Cabinet? Secretary of State Clinton is off "dialoguing" somewhere, but her workload seems tame by comparison to that of the President.
It's good to have a confident self-belief. However, we know from the world of know-it-all, self-absorbed CEO's (pick a name, any name: Welch, Greenberg, Fuld, Cayne..) that there is a razor's edge between self-belief and hubris. It is always good for a real leader to delegate to trusted lieutenants who are expert in their areas. I forget, do we have a Car Czar?
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Green Shoots in Governance
Shareholders at Bank of America were able to carry a vote to separate the roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. This is a very encouraging sign. Although separating the roles is not sufficient to guarantee superior performance or governance, it allows the board and management to concentrate on their distinct roles, avoids conflicts of interest, and permits the exercise of comparative advantage between executives and directors.
The less encouraging news is that the Board Chair is a college president. Academic institutions are not known for transparency, effective cost management, providing value for their student customers, or for maximizing returns. However, it is possible that the new Chair is someone who can bring a fractious board together into an effective governing unit.
If CEO Lewis is in fact a good operating executive, he is now free to concentrate on what needs to be done on the business side, and he can leave all the other issues to the Board Chair. He should be thankful and he should be relieved. If he and his supporters take the move in the wrong way and look on it as a "vote of confidence," then he will lose his focus and probably needs to be monitored closely by the board.
Some measures for shareholder non-binding "say on pay" resolutions were defeated, but there are a few green shoots in this proxy season.
The less encouraging news is that the Board Chair is a college president. Academic institutions are not known for transparency, effective cost management, providing value for their student customers, or for maximizing returns. However, it is possible that the new Chair is someone who can bring a fractious board together into an effective governing unit.
If CEO Lewis is in fact a good operating executive, he is now free to concentrate on what needs to be done on the business side, and he can leave all the other issues to the Board Chair. He should be thankful and he should be relieved. If he and his supporters take the move in the wrong way and look on it as a "vote of confidence," then he will lose his focus and probably needs to be monitored closely by the board.
Some measures for shareholder non-binding "say on pay" resolutions were defeated, but there are a few green shoots in this proxy season.
Tuesday, April 28, 2009
Say (What) On Pay?
Directors of Chesapeake Energy have managed to thumb their noses at investor dissatisfaction over outrageous executive pay packages by ponying up $112 million to its CEO, which included a bonus equal to more than 75 times the CEO's base pay and $33 million in stock awards. Please note that the stock price declined during the measurement period; imagine the bonus if the stock price had risen!
Just to make sure that investors got a finger in both eyes, the board also did business with some CEO-affiliated companies and bought the CEO's collection of maps and artwork for $12 million.
So for all the talk about proxy access and "say on pay," some boards manage to remain tone deaf to their fiduciary duties and to any kind of business common sense.
Just to make sure that investors got a finger in both eyes, the board also did business with some CEO-affiliated companies and bought the CEO's collection of maps and artwork for $12 million.
So for all the talk about proxy access and "say on pay," some boards manage to remain tone deaf to their fiduciary duties and to any kind of business common sense.
Labels:
Corporate Culture,
Executive Comp,
Governance
Monday, April 27, 2009
The Future for GM Shareholders
Today, the Federal Government announced the latest version of the GM bailout plan. A small note in this version has GM retaining the GMC division and shedding Pontiac, which is a much better idea than the original proposal that would have sent GMC into a "bad company," along with Saturn. So somewhere in the discussion, the Administration learned something about GM's light truck business and the value of the GMC nameplate and products.
The proposed exchange offer would have bondholders getting $0.38 on a dollar versus versus $0.10 that is reflected in the secondary markets for the bonds; however, according to the Wall Street Journal and Morgan Keegan, they would get only a 10% interest in GM after the restructuring.
What's more troubling is the fact that the Government will be a much larger equity holder than in earlier proposals. The role of independent trustee directors who represent the taxpayers has always been without precedence and legal guidance. Legitimate questions are raised about the objectives of these independent trustees. It seems reasonable that their minimal duties should be to ensure that the taxpayer injections of funds are repaid, and that they company is run to generate a commensurate return without taking undue risks. Now, however, comes the inevitable discussion from observers like Robert Reich that these directors should have other, broader social objectives.
Finally, I wouldn't be surprised to see proxy access proposals coming from minority shareholders like the UAW to achieve their own ends. Would the government's trustee directors owe loyalty to proposals from politically-motivated minority shareholders? I suspect there would be pressure on them to be beholden to special interests like these.
So, where would that leave an institutional shareholder? In the short-run, there may be a quick trade for hedge funds in the shares, if the economy is beginning to turn. However, this plan will have unintended consequences that are not visible yet to downstream players like the parts suppliers and the surviving dealer network.
I would guess that the most bullish analysts would rate GM shares a "Hold."
The proposed exchange offer would have bondholders getting $0.38 on a dollar versus versus $0.10 that is reflected in the secondary markets for the bonds; however, according to the Wall Street Journal and Morgan Keegan, they would get only a 10% interest in GM after the restructuring.
What's more troubling is the fact that the Government will be a much larger equity holder than in earlier proposals. The role of independent trustee directors who represent the taxpayers has always been without precedence and legal guidance. Legitimate questions are raised about the objectives of these independent trustees. It seems reasonable that their minimal duties should be to ensure that the taxpayer injections of funds are repaid, and that they company is run to generate a commensurate return without taking undue risks. Now, however, comes the inevitable discussion from observers like Robert Reich that these directors should have other, broader social objectives.
Finally, I wouldn't be surprised to see proxy access proposals coming from minority shareholders like the UAW to achieve their own ends. Would the government's trustee directors owe loyalty to proposals from politically-motivated minority shareholders? I suspect there would be pressure on them to be beholden to special interests like these.
So, where would that leave an institutional shareholder? In the short-run, there may be a quick trade for hedge funds in the shares, if the economy is beginning to turn. However, this plan will have unintended consequences that are not visible yet to downstream players like the parts suppliers and the surviving dealer network.
I would guess that the most bullish analysts would rate GM shares a "Hold."
Thursday, April 23, 2009
What Does Pakistan Have to Do With BRICs?
Brazil, Russia, India and China are the so-called BRIC countries, deemed to be future global leaders because of their natural resource, technology, and human capital advantages over other emerging countries.
The news from Pakistan continues to be grim, and the news coverage is extremely poor, which is a byproduct of the breathless, callow and superficial coverage accorded to international affairs by well-coiffed cable news reporters in fatigues. It seems as if the central Government of the Pakistani state is either on radio silence or on the verge of collapse. Either scenario is very bad for world business and should be covered by business reporters rather than obsessing about a meaningless first quarter earnings report by a bank.
If the Pakistani state is collapsing, the immediate question is "Who's in charge?" The answer may not be consoling. Now with India embroiled in its own election process, it is unclear how some of the extremist viewpoints that are part and parcel of parties and coalitions will react to developments in Pakistan. If extremists view a state collapse as an opportunity to settle long-standing grudges, that will be very bad for human rights, civilians, and for business.
So, India will have its own issues going forward, in addition to the glacial pace of true economic and social reform in the country. So, we don't know if this BRIC belongs in the wall of fame yet.
Related developments in Afghanistan shouldn't be surprising either, as US commanders are now citing the deterioration in the southern Afghan Taliban strongholds. Great progress has been made with limited resources, but the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are very closely related. Developments in both countries bear much more in-depth, thoughtful dialogue and foreign policy initiatives. In the long-run, that would be good politics and good business.
The news from Pakistan continues to be grim, and the news coverage is extremely poor, which is a byproduct of the breathless, callow and superficial coverage accorded to international affairs by well-coiffed cable news reporters in fatigues. It seems as if the central Government of the Pakistani state is either on radio silence or on the verge of collapse. Either scenario is very bad for world business and should be covered by business reporters rather than obsessing about a meaningless first quarter earnings report by a bank.
If the Pakistani state is collapsing, the immediate question is "Who's in charge?" The answer may not be consoling. Now with India embroiled in its own election process, it is unclear how some of the extremist viewpoints that are part and parcel of parties and coalitions will react to developments in Pakistan. If extremists view a state collapse as an opportunity to settle long-standing grudges, that will be very bad for human rights, civilians, and for business.
So, India will have its own issues going forward, in addition to the glacial pace of true economic and social reform in the country. So, we don't know if this BRIC belongs in the wall of fame yet.
Related developments in Afghanistan shouldn't be surprising either, as US commanders are now citing the deterioration in the southern Afghan Taliban strongholds. Great progress has been made with limited resources, but the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are very closely related. Developments in both countries bear much more in-depth, thoughtful dialogue and foreign policy initiatives. In the long-run, that would be good politics and good business.
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
Checks and Balances
I learned in my grammar school civics class that our government was founded on a system of checks and balances that included some "creative tension" among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. By analogy, our capital markets depend on creative tensions among public company boards and management, institutional investors, external auditors, analysts, and the SEC. We continue to have a systemic failure and lock-up of all these checks and balances as the credit debacle continues to languish on.
Registered investment management firms are required to file form N-PX that lists how the asset management firm voted on proxy proposals solicited by their portfolio companies. It's a curious thing, but I rarely recall seeing a negative vote cast about director candidates, board governance changes, or management compensation plans. So, with the current clamor for "Say on Pay," it's good to remember that shareholders have always had a right to vote their opinion, but never did so during the periods of most egregious abuse. John Bogle of Vanguard has recently spoken out about the failure of his own mutual fund industry to act as effective fiduciaries for their retail and institutional shareholders. His address at Columbia University is worthwhile reading.
On the executive compensation side, as far as I can tell, the compensation consultants still have their place at the board table, inflating and escalating outlandish CEO compensation that has no relation to the creation of sustainable value. Board turnover does not seem to be out of the ordinary. Against the background of this systemic failure of checks and balances, it is not surprising that politicians step into the vacuum with rules that will not be efficient and will have unintended consequences.
Registered investment management firms are required to file form N-PX that lists how the asset management firm voted on proxy proposals solicited by their portfolio companies. It's a curious thing, but I rarely recall seeing a negative vote cast about director candidates, board governance changes, or management compensation plans. So, with the current clamor for "Say on Pay," it's good to remember that shareholders have always had a right to vote their opinion, but never did so during the periods of most egregious abuse. John Bogle of Vanguard has recently spoken out about the failure of his own mutual fund industry to act as effective fiduciaries for their retail and institutional shareholders. His address at Columbia University is worthwhile reading.
On the executive compensation side, as far as I can tell, the compensation consultants still have their place at the board table, inflating and escalating outlandish CEO compensation that has no relation to the creation of sustainable value. Board turnover does not seem to be out of the ordinary. Against the background of this systemic failure of checks and balances, it is not surprising that politicians step into the vacuum with rules that will not be efficient and will have unintended consequences.
So, the solution is for the market participants to 'fess up and join with the Federal government to devise a capital markets regulatory structure that provides efficient markets along with transparency, bounded risk-creation, and appropriate levels of protection for investors. Let's hope we start moving there soon.
Monday, April 6, 2009
It's Still A Bad Plan
In a post dated February 13th, we made two key points. First, we felt that forcing financial firms into some form of bankruptcy was superior to substantial direct investment by the government. Second, we believed that the plan-without-details for buying toxic assets through private-public partnerships was an extremely bad idea.
Now with the passage of time and some more details, we feel even more strongly about these positions. In a paper by Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., "Bankruptcy or Bailouts?", the authors note that it has been a guiding principle of Fed Chair Bernanke and former Secretary Paulson to "..avoid bankruptcy filings by the distressed firms...based on the belief that if a troubled firm files for bankruptcy, the consequences would be severe." The risks are categorized as firm-specific, including the rapid dissipation in value of the firm's assets, and systemic, such as the continued erosion in confidence. They note that three days after filing for Chapter 11 protection, Lehman Brothers had garnered court approval for the sale of its North American investment banking operation to Barclays, which provided $450 million debtor-in-possession financing. Two weeks after filing, Lehman had sold its European, Middle East and Asia operations to Nomura and its investment management business to two private equity firms. Through this example they show that the concerns about bankruptcy being slow and increasing firm specific risk, are not as significant as interventionists say they are. The authors are, respectively, law professors at Northwestern and the University of Pennsylvania.
Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz, writing in the New York Times ("Obama's Ersatz Capitalism," March 31, 2009) exposes the Geithner plan to purchase troubled assets via public-private partnerships. His characterization, drawn through two scenarios, shows that the plan socializes the potential losses, while offering private investors, pre-crisis returns of more than three times their equity investment. Professor Stiglitz sums it up best when he says, "The Geithner plans works only if and when the taxpayer loses big time." Yet, this plan cannot die at this point, for political reasons.
Today it is being tweaked again, not for its fundamental construction, but for issues of access by smaller firms to the candy being handed out by the Fed and Treasury. As several observers have noted, the ongoing financial crisis is not fundamentally about liquidity, but about confidence in the financial system. Despite all the press conferences and releases, very little of substance has been accomplished to restore confidence in the efficiency, transparency, fairness, and governance of the financial system.
Now with the passage of time and some more details, we feel even more strongly about these positions. In a paper by Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., "Bankruptcy or Bailouts?", the authors note that it has been a guiding principle of Fed Chair Bernanke and former Secretary Paulson to "..avoid bankruptcy filings by the distressed firms...based on the belief that if a troubled firm files for bankruptcy, the consequences would be severe." The risks are categorized as firm-specific, including the rapid dissipation in value of the firm's assets, and systemic, such as the continued erosion in confidence. They note that three days after filing for Chapter 11 protection, Lehman Brothers had garnered court approval for the sale of its North American investment banking operation to Barclays, which provided $450 million debtor-in-possession financing. Two weeks after filing, Lehman had sold its European, Middle East and Asia operations to Nomura and its investment management business to two private equity firms. Through this example they show that the concerns about bankruptcy being slow and increasing firm specific risk, are not as significant as interventionists say they are. The authors are, respectively, law professors at Northwestern and the University of Pennsylvania.
Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz, writing in the New York Times ("Obama's Ersatz Capitalism," March 31, 2009) exposes the Geithner plan to purchase troubled assets via public-private partnerships. His characterization, drawn through two scenarios, shows that the plan socializes the potential losses, while offering private investors, pre-crisis returns of more than three times their equity investment. Professor Stiglitz sums it up best when he says, "The Geithner plans works only if and when the taxpayer loses big time." Yet, this plan cannot die at this point, for political reasons.
Today it is being tweaked again, not for its fundamental construction, but for issues of access by smaller firms to the candy being handed out by the Fed and Treasury. As several observers have noted, the ongoing financial crisis is not fundamentally about liquidity, but about confidence in the financial system. Despite all the press conferences and releases, very little of substance has been accomplished to restore confidence in the efficiency, transparency, fairness, and governance of the financial system.
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