If this keeps up, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke should move his office to the White House. The cacophony about QE2 continues to undermine the Fed's independence and role in monetary policy, as it appears that there is now a philosophical divergence between the Federal Reserve Chairman and a number of Governors, who appear to be talking more like traditional central bankers.
Let's think about traditional, non-monetary sources of inflation, apart from commodity price shocks and one-time events. Pressures from non-monetary sources should be reflected in capacity utilization rates in key industries, or in labor market measures, such as hours worked, overtime, unfilled job orders, and hourly labor rates. On all of these measures, there is no evidence of imminent inflationary pressure to be found. In the Chairman's own words, "We see an economy which has a very high level of under utilization of resources and a relatively slow growth rate."
What's fundamentally wrong with the continuing reliance on monetary instruments like QE2? Fed Governor Kevin Warsh, quoted in today's Wall Street Journal, says, "The Federal Reserve is not a repair shop to fix broken fiscal, trade or regulatory policies." It is, however, acting as if it were such a repair shop, providing band aids for the continuing lack of any coherent fiscal policy initiatives to improve capacity utilization, investment, or the labor markets.
Chairman Bernanke has made comments about the effects of negative real interest rates helping consumers repair their balance sheets by driving equity prices higher. I thought we should have learned from former Chairman Greenspan's tenure that this isn't the brief of a central banker. The late Nobel Laureate economist Milton Friedman would be jumping up to object to this line of argument as well. For the broad swath of U.S. consumers, higher equity prices are primarily reflected in the market values of their 401(k)'s. Unless they were to take out loans against these, they should have no impact on consumption. In Friedman's theory, they would look through this paper effect and conclude that there was no true increase in their permanent income, and hence they would not raise their consumption levels. This entire line of reasoning is misguided and off-target.
Where the Fed's QE initiatives appear to be succeeding is in driving down the value of the U.S. dollar, and creating a new carry trade where the funds are flowing to emerging markets and commodities. Unfortunately, these policies stimulate reactions by our trading partners in a negative feedback loop. So, Wall Street wins and Main Street continues to have the street lights out. Let's see if an emboldened Republic leadership and a chastened Democratic leadership can cobble together some meaningful budget reductions and fiscal stimulus that encourages investment. That would be nice.
Monday, November 8, 2010
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
Closing the Book on JOE
I listened to the third quarter earnings conference call by the St. Joe Company, and I have to close the book on this story, but here's what I noted. After the usual formalities, and before the
Q&A, the CEO gave a verbal overview of the company's historical evolution and business strategy; he seemed to be doing an elevator pitch to answer the question, "What is St. Joe?" It is something that needs to be done on a grander scale and on a more thorough basis in their public disclosures. I'm sure that their shareholders encouraged something like this. It was a good start, but less than effectively realized.
Next, the CFO gave a very dryly formulated description of their impairment review process for long-lived assets, concluding with the statement that the process showed their long-lived assets to be appropriately valued at the end of the third quarter. The external auditors were cited as reviewing the analysis and process, although it was not clear what period the review covered. Later in the call, the CFO noted that the company had taken $196 million in impairments over the past three years, meaning that it was not averse to taking write downs where warranted. Again, it's good to deal with the issue directly, but it could have been done in the context of a positive statement about shareholder value.
The company did address at least two points that were covered in the Greenlight Capital presentation by David Einhorn. The first was the suggestion by Greenlight that Southwest Airline's investment in gates at Panama City International Airport was in tatters. St. Joe, which is on the hook to make up any Southwest losses for three years, noted that the Southwest Airlines investment in the gates was "profitable from day one," and that the third summer quarter exceeded the airline's expectations, generating the best profit since the signing of the agreement. There's no doubt that the talcum powder, white sands of the Florida Panhandle could make an attractive tourist destination, but the key questions are "For how many people with what kinds of budgets?" and "When?"
The second point addressed the suggestion by Mr. Einhorn that St. Joe had given away access to the airport site to the airport authority and now needed to get "through the fence access" in order to share in future development rights. On the face of it, this seemed like a giveaway. In fact, this isn't true, according to the company. Through the fence access rights were reserved to St. Joe and enshrined in the original agreement with the airport authority, and rights conferred on the authority were limited to the development of aviation infrastructure, such as runways and supporting structures.
The analyst questions from Raymond James, Keefe Bruyette Woods, JMP Securities, and Morningstar were alternately fawning, vague, and unlikely to produce research that would generate additional institutional ownership. Towards the end of the call, one analyst dwelt tediously on the specific lease terms for a single CVS drugstore, as if this by itself made any difference to the valuation of the company or its prospects. My advice to the company would be to work hard on telling your own story better, with clear financial metrics.
There was a question about cash burn rates relative to $196 million in cash and when the company would get to profitability. Unfortunately, the CFO didn't really complete the answer to the question. If I understood, his comment was that cash S,G&A expense, excluding one-time items, declined 21% year-over-year, so the management had their eyes on the till. He didn't venture a forecast on profitability.
We're going to close the book on this JOE story, but I wouldn't expect to see the company gaining additional shareholders until the runway to shareholder value creation becomes visible.
Q&A, the CEO gave a verbal overview of the company's historical evolution and business strategy; he seemed to be doing an elevator pitch to answer the question, "What is St. Joe?" It is something that needs to be done on a grander scale and on a more thorough basis in their public disclosures. I'm sure that their shareholders encouraged something like this. It was a good start, but less than effectively realized.
Next, the CFO gave a very dryly formulated description of their impairment review process for long-lived assets, concluding with the statement that the process showed their long-lived assets to be appropriately valued at the end of the third quarter. The external auditors were cited as reviewing the analysis and process, although it was not clear what period the review covered. Later in the call, the CFO noted that the company had taken $196 million in impairments over the past three years, meaning that it was not averse to taking write downs where warranted. Again, it's good to deal with the issue directly, but it could have been done in the context of a positive statement about shareholder value.
The company did address at least two points that were covered in the Greenlight Capital presentation by David Einhorn. The first was the suggestion by Greenlight that Southwest Airline's investment in gates at Panama City International Airport was in tatters. St. Joe, which is on the hook to make up any Southwest losses for three years, noted that the Southwest Airlines investment in the gates was "profitable from day one," and that the third summer quarter exceeded the airline's expectations, generating the best profit since the signing of the agreement. There's no doubt that the talcum powder, white sands of the Florida Panhandle could make an attractive tourist destination, but the key questions are "For how many people with what kinds of budgets?" and "When?"
The second point addressed the suggestion by Mr. Einhorn that St. Joe had given away access to the airport site to the airport authority and now needed to get "through the fence access" in order to share in future development rights. On the face of it, this seemed like a giveaway. In fact, this isn't true, according to the company. Through the fence access rights were reserved to St. Joe and enshrined in the original agreement with the airport authority, and rights conferred on the authority were limited to the development of aviation infrastructure, such as runways and supporting structures.
The analyst questions from Raymond James, Keefe Bruyette Woods, JMP Securities, and Morningstar were alternately fawning, vague, and unlikely to produce research that would generate additional institutional ownership. Towards the end of the call, one analyst dwelt tediously on the specific lease terms for a single CVS drugstore, as if this by itself made any difference to the valuation of the company or its prospects. My advice to the company would be to work hard on telling your own story better, with clear financial metrics.
There was a question about cash burn rates relative to $196 million in cash and when the company would get to profitability. Unfortunately, the CFO didn't really complete the answer to the question. If I understood, his comment was that cash S,G&A expense, excluding one-time items, declined 21% year-over-year, so the management had their eyes on the till. He didn't venture a forecast on profitability.
We're going to close the book on this JOE story, but I wouldn't expect to see the company gaining additional shareholders until the runway to shareholder value creation becomes visible.
Sunday, October 31, 2010
The Curious Case of JOE
In following up the recent tempest about asset valuations at JOE, several curious things stand out. For an institutional stock with very concentrated holdings, it seems to have almost no significant Wall Street research coverage. The best known firm I can find is Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, long known for expertise in financial services but not necesarily for real estate. Their analyst is quoted as saying that the points raised by Greenlight Capital are "overdone." Nothing analytical that I can access to back that point up. The S&P report on the company is totally uninformative. If anyone has some current institutional research that they'd like to pass on, I would gladly peruse it.
S&P also lists no peer companies for JOE. The company's proxy report lists many peer companies for executive compensation purposes, and the list includes REITs. home builders, and developers. Plum Creek Timber is one of the largest private landowners in the US, and came out of a similar corporate history to JOE. Yet it is a REIT, and as such paid out $205 million out of some $312 million in CFO for the most recent nine months of the current fiscal year. JOE can't provide such income comfort to its investors, and its story appears entirely on the come.
Neophytes to the stock, like myself, go to the corporate web page and are greeted by references to the Deepwater Horizon incident, the prevalence of tar balls on beach properties, and the suggestion that the company is pursuing litigation to make things right. Huh? Cash out the door, years in litigation, standing in a long queue for a settlement. This is something for an investor to get excited about? The photos of some luxe developments are in stark contrast to those in the Greenlight Capital presentation. How can these contradictions be resolved? A company conference call is scheduled for November 2nd. Hopefully there will be some good Q&A on the call, and we'll all know more.
S&P also lists no peer companies for JOE. The company's proxy report lists many peer companies for executive compensation purposes, and the list includes REITs. home builders, and developers. Plum Creek Timber is one of the largest private landowners in the US, and came out of a similar corporate history to JOE. Yet it is a REIT, and as such paid out $205 million out of some $312 million in CFO for the most recent nine months of the current fiscal year. JOE can't provide such income comfort to its investors, and its story appears entirely on the come.
Neophytes to the stock, like myself, go to the corporate web page and are greeted by references to the Deepwater Horizon incident, the prevalence of tar balls on beach properties, and the suggestion that the company is pursuing litigation to make things right. Huh? Cash out the door, years in litigation, standing in a long queue for a settlement. This is something for an investor to get excited about? The photos of some luxe developments are in stark contrast to those in the Greenlight Capital presentation. How can these contradictions be resolved? A company conference call is scheduled for November 2nd. Hopefully there will be some good Q&A on the call, and we'll all know more.
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Musing About Margins
When the global meltdown began a couple of years ago now, analysts all over the world agreed that the financial sector, particularly in the United States, had simply become too big. Whether measured by percent of GDP or percent of the S&P's capitalization, the lubricant of our economic system had become bigger than its wheels. We then tried to make this into slogans, "Too big to fail," or "To big to save." Reading the news in the current earnings season, the financial sector continues to live large.
Cleveland-based Eaton Corporation (NYSE: ETN) reported outstanding results for a global leader in power management systems, hydraulics, automotive and aerospace. My former colleague, Norm Klopp of Midwestern Investment Management, always liked this stock. Core revenues were up 18% for this global leader, and operating EPS rose 32 percent year-over-year. Segment operating margins increased to 13%. Good company, with good management and a business model leveraged to strong volume increases, and it's as good as it gets.
Now move over to medical devices, a sector with which I'm familiar first hand. This sector offered great demographics, unmet clinical needs, technological innovation, and proprietary technologies. Multiples were in the ozone years back. St. Jude Medical (NYSE: STJ) reported an 11% revenue increase for their fiscal third quarter, and operating EPS up 5% year-over-year. Operating margins increased to 26%. That is a pretty nice margin for a manufacturing business, and it reflects characteristics of the device business. St. Jude is selling at 13x this year's projected operating EPS, reflecting uncertainty about reimbursement and healthcare reform. Remember, STJ's operating margins are twice those of the more industrial Eaton.
So, what made me wring my hands this morning? BlackRock (NYSE: BLK) reported a 74% increase in third quarter earnings, besting all analyst estimates, driven by its acquisition of Barclay's Global Investors, the leader in indexed fund products. Current operating margins were 33.8%, projected by the CEO to move to 40 percent, which will be driven by asset inflows into indexed equity and fixed income funds. I don't mean to single out BlackRock, because the large banks would also be poster children, but it was the absolute value of the operating margin that drew my attention.
In the funds business, there's no metal bending, no R&D, no product development risk, no product liability, no price controls, no FDA regulation, and no accountability for poor performance, since indexed products mimic the market risk. Goldman Sachs is reported to be ready to redeem Berkshire Hathaway's $5 billion convertible because, among other things, it has $1 trillion in excess liquidity with the Federal Reserve Bank. Something is wrong with this picture, and it could be that some numbers, particularly for banks as opposed to asset managers, are illusory.
We've written before about this issue. Simon Johnson takes a stab at guesstimating the unrecorded bank portfolio write downs as being $50-$100 billion, with a ten percent probability of losses being multiples of his estimated range. Really, really big in other words. Even if we careen to this scenario, there will be no reform and no accountability. Former CEO Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide Financial, one of the great enablers of Fannie who poured jet fuel over the early flames of the mortgage crisis, walks away with no life style changes, while the housing sector is beginning yet another episode of cardiac arrest. I took a Rolaids with my coffee.
Cleveland-based Eaton Corporation (NYSE: ETN) reported outstanding results for a global leader in power management systems, hydraulics, automotive and aerospace. My former colleague, Norm Klopp of Midwestern Investment Management, always liked this stock. Core revenues were up 18% for this global leader, and operating EPS rose 32 percent year-over-year. Segment operating margins increased to 13%. Good company, with good management and a business model leveraged to strong volume increases, and it's as good as it gets.
Now move over to medical devices, a sector with which I'm familiar first hand. This sector offered great demographics, unmet clinical needs, technological innovation, and proprietary technologies. Multiples were in the ozone years back. St. Jude Medical (NYSE: STJ) reported an 11% revenue increase for their fiscal third quarter, and operating EPS up 5% year-over-year. Operating margins increased to 26%. That is a pretty nice margin for a manufacturing business, and it reflects characteristics of the device business. St. Jude is selling at 13x this year's projected operating EPS, reflecting uncertainty about reimbursement and healthcare reform. Remember, STJ's operating margins are twice those of the more industrial Eaton.
So, what made me wring my hands this morning? BlackRock (NYSE: BLK) reported a 74% increase in third quarter earnings, besting all analyst estimates, driven by its acquisition of Barclay's Global Investors, the leader in indexed fund products. Current operating margins were 33.8%, projected by the CEO to move to 40 percent, which will be driven by asset inflows into indexed equity and fixed income funds. I don't mean to single out BlackRock, because the large banks would also be poster children, but it was the absolute value of the operating margin that drew my attention.
In the funds business, there's no metal bending, no R&D, no product development risk, no product liability, no price controls, no FDA regulation, and no accountability for poor performance, since indexed products mimic the market risk. Goldman Sachs is reported to be ready to redeem Berkshire Hathaway's $5 billion convertible because, among other things, it has $1 trillion in excess liquidity with the Federal Reserve Bank. Something is wrong with this picture, and it could be that some numbers, particularly for banks as opposed to asset managers, are illusory.
We've written before about this issue. Simon Johnson takes a stab at guesstimating the unrecorded bank portfolio write downs as being $50-$100 billion, with a ten percent probability of losses being multiples of his estimated range. Really, really big in other words. Even if we careen to this scenario, there will be no reform and no accountability. Former CEO Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide Financial, one of the great enablers of Fannie who poured jet fuel over the early flames of the mortgage crisis, walks away with no life style changes, while the housing sector is beginning yet another episode of cardiac arrest. I took a Rolaids with my coffee.
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Доверяй, но проверяй (Trust, But Verify)
Fairholme portfolio manager Bruce Berkowitz, whose fund owns 29% of JOE, is quoted in the Wall Street Journal today, in response to valuation questions raised by David Einhorn's Greenlight Capital: "There are auditors, a CFO and that stuff gets looked at on a quarterly basis." For Mr. Einhorn to be correct, that would mean "the auditors are sleeping," Berkowitz added.
No kidding! Where have we heard this before? Early in my career as an analyst, after I got burned by a few charismatics CEO's, I adopted the tenets of the Russian proverb loved by the late President Ronald Reagan. Start with the financial statements and notes, sure, but always look for independent validation. One only has to go back to the Anton Valukas Examiner's report on the collapse of Lehman Brothers to find failures by auditors, boards, CEO's, CFO's and legal teams. The savvy value investors I dealt with as a CFO really did their homework, which is why they were often early in a story, and often right. They also looked for a margin of safety.
Mr. Berkowitz also suggests that the management of JOE should hold an "analysts day" and take investors through the properties! I can just see the internal legal team choking on their bagels as they read this suggestion. Isn't it a bit late for what would now be seen as a PR stunt?
Fairholme has had a huge influx of cash since its early success and subsequent awards by the financial press, including Morningstar. It's not possible to tell from the website, filings, or reports how big a research staff Fairholme has. One wonders how such a large stake in JOE could be accumulated without these significant asset quality issues having been independently vetted by Fairholme. It wouldn't give me comfort to then see increasingly large stakes taken in AIG by Fairholme, since AIG was always an incredibly complex company with a dismissive attitude towards analysts, and a poor history of governance and transparency.
JOE has been very silent itself on the issues raised by Greenlight Capital. Now, JOE is in a reactive position, which is risky and undesirable. However, it has no choice but to try and help the market decipher where reality lies between the positions of its large stakeholders, for the benefit of all its constituencies.
No kidding! Where have we heard this before? Early in my career as an analyst, after I got burned by a few charismatics CEO's, I adopted the tenets of the Russian proverb loved by the late President Ronald Reagan. Start with the financial statements and notes, sure, but always look for independent validation. One only has to go back to the Anton Valukas Examiner's report on the collapse of Lehman Brothers to find failures by auditors, boards, CEO's, CFO's and legal teams. The savvy value investors I dealt with as a CFO really did their homework, which is why they were often early in a story, and often right. They also looked for a margin of safety.
Mr. Berkowitz also suggests that the management of JOE should hold an "analysts day" and take investors through the properties! I can just see the internal legal team choking on their bagels as they read this suggestion. Isn't it a bit late for what would now be seen as a PR stunt?
Fairholme has had a huge influx of cash since its early success and subsequent awards by the financial press, including Morningstar. It's not possible to tell from the website, filings, or reports how big a research staff Fairholme has. One wonders how such a large stake in JOE could be accumulated without these significant asset quality issues having been independently vetted by Fairholme. It wouldn't give me comfort to then see increasingly large stakes taken in AIG by Fairholme, since AIG was always an incredibly complex company with a dismissive attitude towards analysts, and a poor history of governance and transparency.
JOE has been very silent itself on the issues raised by Greenlight Capital. Now, JOE is in a reactive position, which is risky and undesirable. However, it has no choice but to try and help the market decipher where reality lies between the positions of its large stakeholders, for the benefit of all its constituencies.
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Termites and Foreclosures
We wrote in a 2008 post:
"The banking industry has never been set up to effectively and humanely handle large volumes of foreclosures, because it is something that they're not good at and something that was never anticipated on a large scale. The participants in the foreclosure business are yet another unregulated, unseemly lot. Unleashing this process on a large scale is like introducing termites into a house."
Now, yet again, Congress and the pundits are focusing on symptoms like documentation and robosigners. The media discussion, which will feature lots of political posturing and horse trading in front of the upcoming elections, will deflect attention from the fact that tranches of MBS's need to be written down which will again raise questions about portfolios where the paper is held.
Even potentially positive events for consumers, like sales of foreclosed homes have been revealed to be poisonous. Auctioneers have transferred homes to reasonably informed buyers with attached first and second mortgages! No one is responsible for even providing this kind of information to bidders. There's no accountability anywhere in this dismal financial chain and we wonder why consumers are not leading the recovery.
"The banking industry has never been set up to effectively and humanely handle large volumes of foreclosures, because it is something that they're not good at and something that was never anticipated on a large scale. The participants in the foreclosure business are yet another unregulated, unseemly lot. Unleashing this process on a large scale is like introducing termites into a house."
Now, yet again, Congress and the pundits are focusing on symptoms like documentation and robosigners. The media discussion, which will feature lots of political posturing and horse trading in front of the upcoming elections, will deflect attention from the fact that tranches of MBS's need to be written down which will again raise questions about portfolios where the paper is held.
Even potentially positive events for consumers, like sales of foreclosed homes have been revealed to be poisonous. Auctioneers have transferred homes to reasonably informed buyers with attached first and second mortgages! No one is responsible for even providing this kind of information to bidders. There's no accountability anywhere in this dismal financial chain and we wonder why consumers are not leading the recovery.
Thursday, October 14, 2010
A Cup or A Thimble of Joe?
David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital gave a terrific presentation at the Value Investing Congress, titled "Field of Schemes." His target is what's left of the old St. Joe Minerals Company, which shrunk down to a land trust holding timber and mineral assets, now called St. Joe, a public company.
Bruce Berkowitz, manager of the Fairholme Fund, is a lionized investor whose motto is "Ignore The Crowd." Fairholme owns 29% of JOE, according to the last company proxy. Other large owners include T. Rowe Price at 15% and Janus at 12%. Fidelity is shown as owning 6% of the outstanding equity.
As a preface, Einhorn mentions that representatives of the company refused to speak to him as he was doing his research. This violates one of my first principles, paraphrased as "speak to everyone with a legitimate interest in the company, and give them their due." Short sellers often do the best research on Wall Street, with a few exceptions. The other place where good research is done are the distressed debt desks of places like the old Lehman Brothers, and Larry McDonald's book is definitely worth reading for how good research is married to trading.
A CFO can always learn from speaking with the quality, institutional short sellers. There's an old Arab proverb that applies:"Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer." JOE's blowing off David Einhorn was bad judgment, bad business, and bad for the existing shareholders. I also suspect that Einhorn himself tried to speak to Bruce Berkowitz--it would be the first stop given Fairholme's stake--but the NYT reports that Einhorn's calls went unanswered.
The first thing I noted was the trouble beginning when JOE chose a CEO, Peter Runnell, who came from Disney. A decisive step was taken to turn JOE into a real estate developer, a competence for which the company had no history, no depth of management, and no relevant experience on the board of directors. Runnell left in 2008.
Much of the work shown in Einhorn's presentation represents good, solid, fundamental grunt work, with his staff poring over local government filings and regulatory filings which filled in the mosaic where the company's disclosures were inadequate or uninformative. I've spent lots of time in court houses and government offices as an analyst, and there are rich veins of information, but it is tedious and time consuming to go through it. Kudos to Greenlight Capital for doing the work.
Einhorn notes that over the past ten years, JOE has earned some $710 million in pre-tax profits from the sale of low basis cost properties from its beginning portfolio. In other words, its quality of earnings was not good, because of one-time items like gains and because it was not sustainable. Half of the quality portfolio has been sold, according to the presentation.
The company's pitch shifted once much of the quality real estate was sold, and Fairholme reports were about JOE owning land for the Panama City Airport, the construction of which would open Bay County to a huge influx of tourism into an area where JOE was developing resorts, conference centers, homes and golf courses. Einhorn goes into the realities of the fact that JOE's current land holdings are outside of the airport, and the company can't benefit directly from development because it had to give some of the land away to governmental bodies in order to develop it. Only one gate out of seven in the airport can accommodate the jumbo jets flown by Southwest and other major carriers. Current prospects for the airport are uncertain.
Other issues surround the lack of transparency in JOE's disclosures about the amount of capital investment it has made in its properties, the capitalization of expenses, and the fact that properties are reported as developed if one home has been built though the majority of the site is fallow. Einhorn estimates, with reasonable logic, that developed lots in the RiverTown development project are carried on the books at $74.5 million versus his estimated market value of $6 million. He goes through several other projects. The bottom line is that the company has taken relatively little in the way of impairment charges to-date, and based on the fact that the Florida market has been hurt significantly worse than most other US markets, current market values suggest that significant additional write-downs need to be taken. Einhorn's provocative floor for the share price is $7-10 versus a quote of $20.20 at this writing.
He derives the $7-10 number from market value estimates of the remaining rural land in the portfolio, leaving aside some unknown value for 41,000 additional acres of entitled acres that could be developed in the future.
It will be interesting to see where this discussion goes and how the board and the auditors deal with the questions raised. Stay tuned.
Bruce Berkowitz, manager of the Fairholme Fund, is a lionized investor whose motto is "Ignore The Crowd." Fairholme owns 29% of JOE, according to the last company proxy. Other large owners include T. Rowe Price at 15% and Janus at 12%. Fidelity is shown as owning 6% of the outstanding equity.
As a preface, Einhorn mentions that representatives of the company refused to speak to him as he was doing his research. This violates one of my first principles, paraphrased as "speak to everyone with a legitimate interest in the company, and give them their due." Short sellers often do the best research on Wall Street, with a few exceptions. The other place where good research is done are the distressed debt desks of places like the old Lehman Brothers, and Larry McDonald's book is definitely worth reading for how good research is married to trading.
A CFO can always learn from speaking with the quality, institutional short sellers. There's an old Arab proverb that applies:"Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer." JOE's blowing off David Einhorn was bad judgment, bad business, and bad for the existing shareholders. I also suspect that Einhorn himself tried to speak to Bruce Berkowitz--it would be the first stop given Fairholme's stake--but the NYT reports that Einhorn's calls went unanswered.
The first thing I noted was the trouble beginning when JOE chose a CEO, Peter Runnell, who came from Disney. A decisive step was taken to turn JOE into a real estate developer, a competence for which the company had no history, no depth of management, and no relevant experience on the board of directors. Runnell left in 2008.
Much of the work shown in Einhorn's presentation represents good, solid, fundamental grunt work, with his staff poring over local government filings and regulatory filings which filled in the mosaic where the company's disclosures were inadequate or uninformative. I've spent lots of time in court houses and government offices as an analyst, and there are rich veins of information, but it is tedious and time consuming to go through it. Kudos to Greenlight Capital for doing the work.
Einhorn notes that over the past ten years, JOE has earned some $710 million in pre-tax profits from the sale of low basis cost properties from its beginning portfolio. In other words, its quality of earnings was not good, because of one-time items like gains and because it was not sustainable. Half of the quality portfolio has been sold, according to the presentation.
The company's pitch shifted once much of the quality real estate was sold, and Fairholme reports were about JOE owning land for the Panama City Airport, the construction of which would open Bay County to a huge influx of tourism into an area where JOE was developing resorts, conference centers, homes and golf courses. Einhorn goes into the realities of the fact that JOE's current land holdings are outside of the airport, and the company can't benefit directly from development because it had to give some of the land away to governmental bodies in order to develop it. Only one gate out of seven in the airport can accommodate the jumbo jets flown by Southwest and other major carriers. Current prospects for the airport are uncertain.
Other issues surround the lack of transparency in JOE's disclosures about the amount of capital investment it has made in its properties, the capitalization of expenses, and the fact that properties are reported as developed if one home has been built though the majority of the site is fallow. Einhorn estimates, with reasonable logic, that developed lots in the RiverTown development project are carried on the books at $74.5 million versus his estimated market value of $6 million. He goes through several other projects. The bottom line is that the company has taken relatively little in the way of impairment charges to-date, and based on the fact that the Florida market has been hurt significantly worse than most other US markets, current market values suggest that significant additional write-downs need to be taken. Einhorn's provocative floor for the share price is $7-10 versus a quote of $20.20 at this writing.
He derives the $7-10 number from market value estimates of the remaining rural land in the portfolio, leaving aside some unknown value for 41,000 additional acres of entitled acres that could be developed in the future.
It will be interesting to see where this discussion goes and how the board and the auditors deal with the questions raised. Stay tuned.
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