Sunday, July 10, 2011

South China Sea: A UN Framework Foresaw Issues

China has taken dead aim on territorial claims in the South China Sea, which run into often conflicting claims by the Phillipines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea established workable concepts for territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and a framework for waters under international jurisdiction, including special arrangements for straits which were key for international commerce. The U.S. Coast Guard, Merchant Marine and Navy were all on board with the treaty.

Unfortunately, the foolish Republican, neo-isolationists and a handful of American multinationals, many of which are out of business now, got together and decided that the LOS treaty was not something the U.S. needed or should accept. Predictably, in the South China Sea, territorial claims to outlying islands define the outer boundary from which territorial seas and EEZ's are defined. Without a global framework agreed to by all the major powers, China has seized on the notion of signing individual side deals with the smaller ASEAN players. This is not in the interests of these players nor those of the international community, but it's difficult to see how this gets resolved now in a rational, economic way.

What's at stake here? Potentially rich resources of natural gas, for one. Although the inferred resources need quite a bit of proving out, gas resources are said to rival those of Qatar. Other potential subsea mineral deposits have also been identified in the South China Sea. Secretary of State Clinton can try the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy tack here, but we have no leverage at all. China has already taken the position that any compromise on their claims to outlying islands, which they say date back to 1947, represents an attack on their sovereignty.

Not signing the LOS treaty didn't seem like a big deal a few decades ago, but it was truly an impotant opportunity lost, and we'll eventually find out what some of the costs are in the South China Sea and in other areas.

Thursday, July 7, 2011

Corporate Governance: Nothing New

McKinsey's Quarterly Survey of Corporate Governance shows interesting comparisons with the same poll taken in 2008, before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The results should be disappointing for shareholders concerned about board effectiveness.

44% of the respondents say that their boards simply review and approve the strategies proposed by management. 58% of the board members responding said that their knowledge of the company's current strategy was lacking. Roughly the same percent said that their knowledge of the value creation process, company risks and industry dynamics were also lacking.

Have the boards been spending more time on issues? Afraid not. The amount of time spent on strategic issues was about 23% of board time in 20111 versus 24% in 2008. The amount of time spent on talent issues was also roughly unchanged in 2011 versus 2008, at 10% vs. 11% of board time spent on the company.

In order to make things better, board members felt that more time should be devoted to board work, and that a better mix of skills and knowledge should be brought into the board rooms. They also called for "better people dynamics that enable tough, constructive boardroom discussions." Instead of focusing on long winded, uninformative C,D&A and prattling on about sustainability, investors need their boards to work on the fundamental activities which comprise the fiduciary duties of boards.

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Unconventional Gas: Getting Out of Balance Fast

There's no doubt that natural gas is a much better fuel for electricity generation than coal, particularly if we are serious about safety, land and water use issues and about greenhouse gas emissions. Lately, though, the whole discussion has become a rush to unleash drilling in the U.S. for unconventional gas. In the course of the policy discussion, for which our legislators are severely over matched as usual, a number of half truths have been uttered by the industry.

First of all, let's define what we mean by the term, unconventional natural gas resources. We mean tight gas sands, coal bed methane, and gas shales. Methane hydrates are a scientific research curiosity at this point and are not in our use of the term.

It is universally accepted from a geological point of view that unconventional natural gas resources occur in a much more complex and challenging environment than do conventional gas resources.

It is true that North American producers have had roughly five decades of experience producing natural gas from shale. However, this production has generally been at relatively low levels, and it has occured in shallow, fractured shale formations. The experience is not indicative or instructive of what will be encountered in the high volume production of shale gas from deep, low permeability formations like Barnett, Marcellus, Haynesville and the Horn River. The technology to drill is there, but the industry's experience in these kinds of formations is relatively limited.

There has been legitimate concern about the presence of methane near drinking water supplies which are within the northeastern formations. Industry experts, perhaps rightly, conclude that there is no direct association with deep drilling for shale gas. However, it is curious that there are no other obvious explanations for the source of the methane either. We've had a similar occurrence here in Minnesota, in terms of finding methane contamination, and it has been attributed to unauthorized chemical dumping by a manufacturer decades ago. The case for explaining this occurrence is not clear either.

Broadly speaking, according to IEA projections, the US and Canada would be relatively self-sufficient in natural gas in 2035, on the assumption that shale will grow to account for one-third of North American production by then. Natural gas imports will fall from about 10% of supply now to 6% in 2035. Oddly enough, total greenhouse gas emissions from our energy portfolio increase slightly over the forecast period, because the strong growth in unconventional gas production comes at the expense of coal (good) and nuclear (not so good).

The worldwide oil and gas industry knows all about producing hydrocarbons in all kinds of deep water and hostile environments, but that experience has been forged over fifty years or more. On the knowledge curve, for unconventional gas from deep shale formations, the industry has a lot to learn yet. It shouldn't put drinking water supplies and public health at risk by claiming otherwise. Universities, research institutes, the industry, and government agencies need to work together to birth this new energy source in a responsible manner.

On a side note, the sudden, capricious decisions by the governments of Germany and France to scuttle their nuclear industries mean that by 2035 they will be much more dependent on gas imports probably from Russia by pipeline and from Qatar by LNG. This may create balance-of-trade issues as well as heighten security concerns in the future.

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Rare Earths in Pacific Ocean : Don't Get Too Excited

As much as US companies and policy makers are concerned about Chinese export controls on rare earth elements, a WSJ story about Japanese identification of deep-sea muds containing rare earth elements in the Pacific Ocean is not something to get excited about.

Early in my professional career, I headed up a team at the United Nations which helped fund, coordinate and aggregate international research on the geology and economics of subsea minerals, including managanese nodules, subsea massive sulphides (SMS), and subsea muds. A member of my team now heads up the International Seabed Authority as its Secretary-General. This was a heady, exciting time as worldwide science and engineering teams from many countries opened up a new frontier for potential mineral resources.

Unfortunately, international politics, economics, and price declines of key minerals from terrestrial sources all led to the promise of these subsea resources being postponed. The potential is a lot closer now, but we still don't have a real production operation to use as a data point. The Japanese subsea muds are scientifically interesting, but of little import beyond that for the foreseeable future.

Nautilus Minerals (TSE:NUS) has developed an SMS site in the Bismarck Sea, within the territorial waters of Papua New Guinea. The deposit is called Solwara I, and it received its final environmental clearance from the PNG government on December 29, 2009. Indicated reserves in Solwara I are 870 kilotonnes, and inferred reserves are 1,300 kilotonnes. Mineralisation of the deposit comprises a matrix of Cu-Zn-Ag-Au as target minerals.

The company had been pursuing a secondary stock offering in Canada to raise funds for the project, but the offering, even with the Canadian investor appetite for smaller mineral companies, was recently withdrawn. The company does have other alternatives, including further investment from strong strategic partners.

The work done on this project has been exemplary, and to have passed the stringent environmental regulatory framework of PNG is a testament to the corporate collaborative culture, something which U.S. extractive industries lack. Capital expenditures for the system from subsea mining to delivery of dewetted ore to the dock is estimated at about $400 million, with operating costs at $64 per tonne. The subsea collection system has been designed by an industry leading company, and a subsidiary of GE's Oil and Gas segment will operate the subsea lift pumping system.

If there is a project to watch to see the birth of a subsea mining industry, this is the one I'm watching. However, markets and economics still prevail, and the public markets apparently still don't quite have the risk appetite to fund this kind of project at attractive valuations for NUS. Stay tuned.

Old Tech and New Tech : Wrong Question.

Today's WSJ continues the quest to reconcile the ridiculous valuations of recent IPO's like LinkedIn with the current valuations of tech behemoths like Apple, HP, Microsoft, Google and IBM. It's the wrong optic, turned on the wrong set of questions.

These two segments of the market have nothing to do with each other, and broadly speaking, the players who populate these markets are operating under different charters. As we've written about before, every kind of investor wants to get in on the circus of a hot IPO. Flipping is the name of the game, encouraged by the underwriters fanning the flames. Once the IPOs are out in the market place, the game changes and a different mix of players emerges, including those awaiting a small pop from analyst initiation reports, presumably at "Strong Buy."

Investors playing in the seasoned tech equities, as we've written about, are the traditional institutional investors, which now include both growth and value investors. However, the newspaper articles quoting pundits opining about "growth" have it wrong also. It's all about returns, and about risk.

Apple, which has doubled its share price in each of the past five years inevitably had to take a pause and even pull back, in relative terms. It had become a cult stock, and everybody knew about iTouch, iTunes, iPad, iMac and about the slew of competitors who could only play catch up. Questions about Apple's leadership succession have to weigh on the stock. If indeed Apple=Steve Jobs, then it's time to head for the exits. Since no other story has been forthcoming, why not take the money and run, i.e. sell the stock and buy something cheaper?

We know that corporate disclosures for post retirement benefit plans have long included projected returns for equities of 8 percent or better. We know that the decade ended 2009 had stock returns of zero for the broad indexes. Now, everyone is rightly saying how can we continue to project equity returns of 8 percent? So, for the sake of argument, let's say that the projected return on equities for the next ten years is 5 percent, without getting into all kinds of complexities like emerging markets for the moment.

Microsoft has a forward dividend yield of about 2.5 %. This means that to get a return of 5%, an investor would have to get only 2.5% from price appreciation, arising from either higher earnings, higher valuation ratios or some combination. Let's say that US GNP grows at 1-2% per year for the next ten years. MSFT should be able to grow earnings, even at the same valuation, at a GNP growth rate or better. Unless, something like a 100 year storm were to hit--like losing 100 percent of its Office franchise or losing its SQL server business. Even in ten years, how likely is this? This is a risk question. I don't know the answer, to be sure, but I also don't know anyone who does, and that includes bloggers, tech gurus and talking heads. So, even if earnings don't come through, and the dividend were to increase modestly, an investor would have a positive return with seemingly little downside risk.

This is the kind of reasoning that underlies the Tweedy Browne comment that Microsoft is "statistically cheap." Of course, they also refer to the fact that the returns on MSFT's consolidated businesses are still enormously high, even with the current P/E of 9. So, the question is not "growth or no growth," but "market or better return" with "below market risk."
This is the value investor's lens, and it's always been a good one, and it is now especially in these frothy times.

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Cisco and Microsoft: Two Takes on Value

Two of my favorite value-oriented money managers as an analyst and investor are Tweedy Browne and Harris Associates, which runs the Oakmark Funds. Reading the managers' semi-annual report for the Oakmark Equity Fund for the period ended March 31, 2011, we see, "The quarter's largest detractors were Cisco Systems, Microsoft...We clearly have covered ourselves with something other than glory with our investments in large-capitalization technology companies. Cisco continues to suffer profit margin erosion...Microsoft's problems appear to be more strategic, and we exited the stock."

Tweedy Browne broke its somewhat long-held aversion to technology stocks when it initiated a position in Cisco. They wrote in their most recent report,"Cisco is financially strong and we think statistically cheap." In other commentary the managers talk about not being able to understand whose router technology will prevail in the market place, and they appeal to the cheapness of the stock in relation to enterprise value which it says gives them a 30% margin of safety relative to its intrinsic value. It is a dissapointingly tepid reason for buying the stock for a shop that I've always known to be confident about having done their homework.

What's tellingly missing from Tweedy Browne's commentary is any kind of endorsement of the Cisco management, either their track record, commitment to adding value, or their having finally got the "old time religion" about working for the benefit of shareholders. In the end, an equity investor is investing in management, and hopefully alongside of management if they had significant ownership positions themselves.

Cisco may be statistically cheap, and I know it shows up on a lot of value screens. However, I suspect that's how Microsoft looked to Harris Associates when they initiated their position. What made them give up? Problems of a "strategic" nature, which are the bread and butter of management: to formulate and execute a strategy that creates shareholder value above the cost of capital. It will be interesting to watch how these two bellwethers perform in the months and years ahead.

Friday, June 24, 2011

Arab Spring: A Columbia Forecast

The Columbia University Club of Minnesota sponsored a talk on "Change in the Ruling Systems of the Middle East." Richard W. Bulliett is Professor of Middle Eastern History at Columbia University. Given that his discipline was history, Professor Bulliett's context for his outlook began in the 11th century, but I'll definitely telescope a lot of that material. He had some interesting remarks about foreign policy issues beyond the current turmoil in the Middle East.

Arab governments do not generally attack each other. In 1991, this fundamental principle was breached when several Arab states gave assistance to the U.S. coalition in invading Iraq. At the same time, Egypt made peace with Israel. Bulliett sees these events as laying the seeds for the current unrest.

In the eyes of the Arab populace, this violation also de-legitimized the ruling systems of the states that provided aid to another foreign infidel, namely the United States. The most stable ruling systems in the Middle East are those based on the "neo-Mamluk" model. The Mamuluks were the slave-soldiers of the Ottoman Empire, primarily Circassians, Kurds and Turks. In the military tradition that took hold in the Middle East, military leaders came from the lowest social and educational classes, a totally different model from the elite models of Britain and the U.S., where leaders come from Sandhurst and West Point.

Once the neo-Mamluks come into power, their goal is to tap deep roots, through appropriating assets, government monopolies, and widespread nepotism. A kleptocracy is their modus operandi. That is how, for example, the Egyptian military controls most of the prime residential and leisure real estate in Egypt. Once the neo-Mamluks are established, their ideology is very flexible. They are relatively indifferent about secularism, Islamism, socialism, capitalism, or fascism, as long as nothing affects their finances and life styles. While both U.S. political parties may long for an nineteenth century ideal of a secular democracies in the Middle East, this is not even in the political calculus of the neo-Mamluks.

Unlike our Wall Street Journal narrative, Bulliet says that Facebook and Twitter were marginal as far as their impact on the Arab street demonstrations. Good communication tools, no doubt, but they were not the axes of any real revolution.

Mubarak's fate in Egypt was determined by Egyptian generals in a smoky, Chicago-style backroom meeting, though probably in a luxurious palace. "Free and fair" elections will not occur, but rather "credible" elections in which Bulliet says that the Muslim Brotherhood may even achieve a plurality. However, they too understand the rules. Don't go overboard with any reforms that bring the eyes of the world on Egypt, take the counsel of the generals and protect their privileges.

In the many parenthetical sidebars that occur in an academic speech, Bulliet notes that U.S. foreign policy careerists, advisers, consultants, and academics have no idea what is going to transpire in Egypt, or Libya or Syria, for example. That is pretty distressing to hear. He also notes that the Israelis too have no clue what is happening, and they too were totally blindsided by the events leading to the street demonstrations and regime instabilities. This goes against the self-perpetuating mythology of the all-knowing and all-seeing Mossad.

This means that President Obama's call for fresh negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis is hopelessly misguided. Given that the Israelis have no idea what the future political map will look like, they would be ill-advised and irrational if they undertook any substantive negotiations in the current environment.

Professor Bulliet says that the Syrian regime has maintained the highest degree of legitimacy in the minds of Arab peoples, despite economic paralysis and political uncertainty. The reason is that the Syrian regime is the only that is consistently viewed as being anti-American and anti-Israeli from 1991 through the current turmoil. The younger Mr. Assad may likely survive, and then he may embark on some reforms, but nothing will effect the portfolios of the military leaders who lend him their legitimacy. He is not so optimistic about Libya, because, among other things, Mr. Quadaffi has brutally pruned his own military in order to secure his own interest and that of his chosen successor. It looks like it may not work, but what comes after no one knows.

There have been some gains in issues we like to read about, such as women's equality in places like Iran. Fifty percent of the university population in Iran are now women. Their role and power, though, will hardly have changed unless these graduates emigrate. Iranian university students have read classics of the Western canon because they have all been translated into Persian by university faculty looking for reasons to make themselves relevant during the Khomeini ascendancy. By contrast, Bulliet says that no Western works are being translated into Arabic at all, and so secondary and university students in their schools have absolutely no exposure to Western thoughts or ideas, except as filtered through propaganda sources.

So, there won't be many buds on the trees in the Arab spring, and the summer won't be lush. There won't be an outbreak of democratic, modernist states. Bulliet says it may take FIFTY years for any movement beyond the neo-Mamluke model, and even then it may not be the secular, tolerant democratic model that we crave in the West. Not great news, but it's something that our politicians, academicians, intelligence community and citizenry need to understand and study objectively, beyond the lens of the Cold War and anti-terror.