Thursday, September 8, 2011

EU and Euro Are Still Not Out of the Woods

Germany's high court ruling saves face for Chancellor Merkl, but it isn't a resounding endorsement either.  It's unclear to an English speaking reader what the basis was for rejecting the constitutionality of the German government committing taxpayer funds to sovereign bailouts.  However, it does require that the Chancellor seek approval from the parliamentary budget committee before taking on future obligations, as opposed to the current practice of notice after the fact.

Again, there is an element of pragmatism in the high court's directive to go to the budget committee as opposed to the full parliament, which would have meant gridlock and political grandstanding.  In reflecting this pragmatism, the German courts seem vastly more enlightened than our own.

What happens from here?  The pressure will continue to mount.  Finland's demand for its own dedicated collateral in exchange for participating in the current bailout commitment is still on the table, unresolved.  If the Finns back down, they face political issues at home, while if they are accommodated, the flood gates open and the deal falls apart.  The weaker players are currently being subsidized by the ECB's buying of their bonds, supposedly to keep credit spreads narrower than they otherwise would be.

What awaits them down the road?  Greater austerity and fiscal oversight from the EU.   For Italy, this seems like an unacceptable bargain for the shrewd Italian P.M. Berlusconi, whose balanced budget bill requiring a constitutional amendment is on the table today.

There is simply no significant sentiment behind fiscal harmonization in the EU, and any leader from a peripheral country who dared to back the concept would probably be ousted in a snap election.  Failing fiscal harmonization, the ultimate owner of systemic risk in the Eurozone would be Germany.  Do they want to be in that position?  I think not.  Stay tuned.

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Banks Need To Get Smaller

Watching Bank of America's management take continuing headers on banana peels, I thought it a good time to pull back and think again about governance issues and the banks.  I still can't get away from the fact that the banking sector needs to de-concentrate and get more competitive.

Ironically, as we are rightly bemoaning the anti-competitive aspects of ATT's merger with T-Mobile, we seem to have accepted a more anti-competitive and systemically dangerous concentration of assets among the remaining mega-banks.

I'm going to walk through an interesting survey paper by Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Staff Research Report 502, "Corporate Governance and Banks:What Have We Learned From the Financial Crisis?"  I think it more instructive than wallowing in the reality show that seems to be the financial news.

The governance of public banks is more complicated than for non-financial companies because of (1) the multiplicity of stakeholders, and (2) the complexity of their business portfolios, which include traditional banking, investment banking, and proprietary trading.

Bank stakeholders include depositors, debt holders, shareholders, and the government, both as the provider of deposit insurance and as the holder of systemic risk in the event of bank failure. Even though bank capital structures are about 90% debt, as opposed to 40% on average for non-financial corporations, shareholders with their thin layer of equity are given primacy in strategic, business and governance issues.

The authors look as debt as a financing decision for non-financial corporations, whereas they say it is a "factor of production" for modern banks.  Deposit insurance, despite attempts at improving the system, is still essentially a fixed price insurance, and not risk-based in pricing.  I don't believe that any part of the current bogus financial reform has changed this feature, which would put any traditional insurer, but not the Federal government, out of business.

Shareholder primacy has led to executive compensation schemes that are heavily weighted to short-term rewards, which encourage imprudent risk-taking.  They note that from 1996-2007, 29% of the options issued to the top five executives of banks surveyed vested in one year.  According to the authors, "Since 2006, CEO's in the banking sector have had the highest pay of all the executives in the economy."  This is turning anything like traditional economics on its ear.  It makes no rational sense.  The final ignominy: none of this higher incentive has led to better share price performance.

The authors diligently search for better compensation metrics.  They suggest that a metric for CEO's should be related the CDS for their corporation, but this seems subject to too many random elements, and it has not been shown to be a market price with high informational content.  A better idea would be to have a higher percentage of the CEO deferred compensation at risk for bank failures or rescues.  The operational problem would be when the CEO's lawyers and the corporate lawyers draft up what constitutes a failure or a rescue, accounting for every contingency.  Maybe more research would be useful.

Risk management, they find, is typically separated by product line or by organizational lines.  Boards are not able to give an acceptable band of risk taking for the corporation as a whole.  Compensation for key management is all about attracting and retaining, the marketplace never talks about risk management in compensation or in management objectives.

The authors think that regulatory capital can be a substitute governance tool, but I wouldn't be optimistic about it being a sufficient one.  They point out that much of the new capital raised by banks has been through hybrid instruments like preferred stock. This is before Warren Buffett's "trick or treat" with Bank of America.  Rather than raising common equity, because of  low stock prices resulting from their own mismanagement, managements continue to pay dividends and give away free equity kickers to preferred holders.  The authors note that this has overturned the primacy of debt holders despite their being 90% of the capitalization.

The much ballyhooed Volcker Rule has been substantially watered down in both Dodd-Frank and in the Consumer Protection Act of July 2010, which means that the banks will continue to remain systemically important and susceptible to requiring bailouts in the future.  It's not a pretty picture for governance making the sector better, or for learning from our mistakes.

Sunday, September 4, 2011

Taxing High Frequency Trading

A "click tax" on high frequency trading would be a very good idea, if for no other reason than being a controlled experiment.  The Wall Street Journal has a convoluted story about the idea, where it gives space to the conflicted, self-interested apologists for HFT, who are laughable in their special pleading.

The market for large capitalization stocks is very efficient.  If you follow the activities of the Yale University endowment, you can read this opinion in their annual reports on the fund, so I don't think this is a controversial position.  Small capitalization stocks would seem to have less market efficiency, which accounts for the approach of Dimensional Fund Advisors and many other funds who argue for persistent excess returns from small cap investing.

Even here, the question is "How inefficient?"  Also, what's the gain to society versus the cost of narrowing the efficiency, and by how much?  As Lord Adair Turner has pointed out in his writings on lessons from the global meltdown, the whole notion of equilibrium models and mechanistically efficient markets was adopted as a cult religion by market participants, regulators, the Fed, politicians and journalists.  Concepts like VaR and credit default spreads proved to be inadequate and misleading running up to the crisis and beyond.  Efficiency as as a be all and end all is also cultish.

An owner of an HFT firm is quoted in the journal as saying that a transactions tax of 0.01% on high frequency trading would wipe out the business.  There we have it: that's all the value that's being added.  It's not worth it.  The Journal then suggests that HFT is part of the constellation that has made it easier for individuals to trade stocks.  Huh?  How so? It's a ridiculous notion. 

HFT significantly adds to volatility, and volatility is what scares investors and encourages them to "buy high and sell low."  Individual investors are now being told by their brokers that trades are justified by movements in VIX, itself a flawed, circular indicator of market health. 

Let's try the experiment.  Implement the tax.  If the industry goes away, let's see what happens.  Will markets freeze up?  Will spreads widen like the Grand Canyon?  I'll bet that nobody will notice except for the folks pocketing lots of money for an activity that doesn't help investors or our capital markets. 

Friday, September 2, 2011

Sunset for U.S. Solar Industry?

The emergence of a U.S. solar energy industry with leading edge technology seemed like a no brainer, especially given the Obama Administration's policy of favoring wind, solar and biofuels with taxpayer largess.  Recent developments reported by the New York Times are not encouraging, "In addition to Solyndra, Evergreen Solar of Massachusetts and SpectraWatt of New York also filed for bankruptcy in August. BP Solar shut down its factory in Frederick, Maryland, last spring. Those bankruptcies and closings represent almost a fifth of the solar panel manufacturing capacity in the United States, according to GTM Research"

Let's try to follow the economic chain on the solar industry.  Oil prices remain relatively high, especially compared to levels that would allow renewables to take a growing share of our energy portfolio--should be a + for solar.  U.S. companies seem to have developed collection technologies that increase efficiency compared to older panels--should be a + for solar.  The federal and state and local governments have been generous with subsidies for renewables--should be a + for solar.  Yet, the solar industry in the U.S. and even in Germany has been retrenching.  Why?

The NYT article also points out the rapid growth of Chinese solar companies, buoyed by cheap state loans and rock bottom labor costs.  Since China still produces electricity predominantly through coal, and since solar has an infinitesimal share in Chinese energy consumption, it seems clear that the growth in Chinese production is aimed at export markets and therefore the loans violate WTO agreements. This seems like a fairly unproductive use of Chinese government loan capital, as there is no significant demand for solar panel installations in the U.S., except for vanity residential projects by hedge fund billionaires or for corporate sustainability advertising by Google on a data center in the Mojave. 

The residential construction market is moribund, and will stay that way for a while as the issue of foreclosures is worked through the system.  Who would rationally put a solar panel into a remodel?  In this market, many traditional home improvement projects, like basements with pool tables and wet bars, are nor paying back.  New construction isn't focused on solar panels as an amenity either. 

The basic calculation is payback, and the payback isn't viable today.  Our city looked at a solar installation on a community center as a demonstration project, and even with some favorable state government cost-sharing, it was a non-starter.

Perhaps the biggest issue is that it's all off the grid anyway.  Again, if the administration is looking for a "moon shot" type of infrastructure project, it should be to rebuild the U.S. energy transmission grid which would benefit  both consumers and businesses.  Then, if Bono were to build his new recording studio in Joshua Tree Monument, he could just plug the solar panels right into the grid and sell his excess electricity to the utility! 

There's nothing wrong with pursuing improvements in solar panels, as it's a logical focus for science and engineering programs, but we should recognize that this source, along with wind and renewables, will continue to be marginal contributors to our total energy portfolio for some time, unless we are willing to accept both significant changes in life styles and higher costs. 

Thursday, September 1, 2011

Maybe the ECB Will Sue Goldman?

Today's WSJ reports on a Goldman strategist's report to hedge fund clients that takes a "head for the hills" view of European banks. The report, according to the WSJ, opines that "as much as $1 trillion may be needed to shore up European banks." This report is not a product of GS's Research department, which is interesting. It also is explicitly tied to trading desk revenues as it offers hedge fund clients a way to implement the specific strategies outlined in the report by calling GS trading. Bearish euro bets are part of that strategy, clearly.

The article doesn't give a link to the actual report, so bear that in mind when reading this post, as I always like to review a primary source myself. GS's assessment of the US economy and recovery is very main stream, and I wouldn't guess that it's too different from that of the economic analysis group.

Apparently, there is a bank-by-bank analysis of capital adequacy of the European banks. I can' imagine that ECB officials will be happy to hear about the recommendations in this report. Hopefully, they won't issue a press release threatening legal action!

As we head into the fourth quarter, and after reading lots of analyst work on banks and currencies, it seems like we are entering another risky period, with eerie similarities to the earlier crisis. What's more, Dodd Frank will provide no protection or improvement in crisis readiness, because nobody knows how to implement its laundry list of mandates.

Brad Sabel and other partners at Shearman & Sterling have done some insightful analysis on these issues. The Volcker Rule, which is a key part of derisking the global situation, is light years from implementation at this point. Similar to the earlier global crisis, we may be in a situation where stress tests and ECB pronouncements show major European banks to have adequate capital, but we won't know who the weak sister is until some external event forces the curtain back.

Monday, August 29, 2011

Apple's Future May Not Be Its Five Year Past

Steve Jobs' tenure produced a almost eight-fold increase in Apple's stock price, something which will likely not be duplicated in the next five years, no matter who is at the helm of Apple. In the nineties, Apple was a generator of mediocre products that were neither innovative nor priced to deliver value to their customers. The list includes corporate gaffes like Newton, Pippin, Lisa ($9,995 in 1993), the 20th anniversary Mac, portable Mac ($6,500), and the G4 Mac cube ($1,600). Hand picked CEO John Sculley from PepsiCo grew revenues but disastrously chose to have the company sell against IBM in corporate markets, which led to declining profitability.

Technology companies have growth cycles, with the attendant valuation cycles. As we've written before, Apple has become a cult stock. The recent explosion of revenue, returns, and valuation metrics was generated, in our opinion, from the ability of Steve Jobs to cut through the thicket of product development projects to identify the iTunes and iPhone projects as the "must haves" for the company's success. The troops at Apple all rallied to his call, and for such a large organization to focus with great energy and deliver is a testament to executive management, leadership and organizational depth.

The Wall Street Journal asks, "How can ordinary companies turn themselves into Apples?" The answer is easy, "They can't." As framed, it's a vacuous question.

Apple's adolescence, was exemplified by lousy products and a failed strategy, as discussed above. These describe an ordinary company. However, it grew out of adolescence into the young adulthood of the digital era with ideas that revitalized music publishing and enjoyment, as well as giving consumers the iPhone which converged entertainment, information, music, video, and computing in a great package. This is not an ordinary company by any stretch.

As Chairman of the Board, Mr. Jobs has the chance to interact with his hand-picked CEO Tim Cook and form a partnership which will guide Apple through another decade of adding value, but probably not at the rate of the recent past.




Friday, August 26, 2011

Bank of America: The Godfather Comes Calling

The Godfather of American investing, Warren Buffett, came calling on Bank of America's CEO Brian Moynihan, who apparently told Godfather that his company didn't need the capital. Perhaps after some espresso and biscotti, Moynihan reconsidered and accepted the offer that couldn't be refused. The offer, a whited out rewriting of the Goldman Sachs proposition, was for 50,000 shares of cumulative 6% preferred shares at $100,000 each, for a total of $5 billion. Rich ten year warrants for 700 million shares at $7.14 were thrown in as a freebee. There was a one-time boost to the closing equity price.

I''m still struggling to see how this makes the case for the common equity. There is definitely a case for investing higher up the food chain, particularly in Bank of America's bonds. Looking at the June 30th, report for Dodge & Cox Income Fund (DODIX), they have long pursued the strategy of overweighting corporates relative to their BCAG index. As an owner of the fund, I liked this strategy and it has really driven their out performance relative their intermediate bond fund peers.

For the most recent period, the weighting of Corporates went to 44.5% of assets versus 19.8% of the BCAG benchmark. Bank of America's bonds are now the largest corporate issuer in the portfolio, at 2.6% of fund assets. Ally Financial weighs in at 2.4%, and Citigroup at 2.1% of assets. Both Bank of America and Citigroup are stocks that may look like values to the risk-loving investor.

Web commentators have suggested that deposits continue to stream into Bank of America, and bulls suggest that there is money to be made in the stock. It's extremely difficult to project what normalized earnings will be in 2-3 years. Without a reliable estimate, how can one project a reasonable target price?

Since the near-term discussion will be dominated by asset sales, additions to reserves, delinquencies, charge-offs and regulatory hurdles, it's impossible to make a fundamental, valuation driven case for the equity. The bonds clearly have been strong performers, and are senior in the capital structure. It seems as if Mr. Buffett's choice to be higher up the capital structure, i.e. above common equity, but with an equity kicker is another, lower risk way to play Bank of America.