Monday, November 28, 2011

Pulling Out of Afghanistan

                                                                    Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
An Afghani mother brings her child to a village distribution center for drinking water.


Alexander Star's thoughtful New York Times Book Review article on recent books about Afghanistan quotes an observer who characterizes the situation as "a perpetually escalating stalemate."  This is a perfectly apt description of the situation. 

It's hard to think of a modern theater where our military leadership and the men and women under their command have done a better job of trying to understand and work within indigenous cultural and leadership norms.  Our model uses "Human Terrain Teams," working with embedded academics, who are often anthropologists or ethnographers.  The good news is that had we not pursued such an approach, we would have had to beat a Soviet-style retreat, licking our wounds.  The bad news is that for all the bravery and sacrifice of our troops, and for the billions in expenditures, the best we can hope for is a stalemate after the defanging of the Taliban.  It is time for a withdrawal.

Professor Noah Coburn spent two years in the Tajik village of Istalif working on what would become his Ph.D. dissertation at Boston University and his 2011 book, "Bazaar Politics."  Here's a link to an earlier 2009 presentation of Professor Coburn's at the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies.

Coburn found the village of Istalif to be relatively stable because no one was really in charge.  Westerners are captivated by stories of Afghanistan's maliks (elders).  Coborn characterizes the maliks as being the public faces of a village, which means that they meet with NGO representatives, for example. Their actual power and ability to command resources is extremely limited.  The mullahs exert influence which is restricted to within the walls of mosques in Afghanistan.  The merchants who form the Afghan business sector, often live in Kabul and are not respected because of the local caste system.  The merchants come from the caste of weavers, who are not of high caste.  Even government officials are generally not powerful, as the actual disbursement of funds is left to local councils. 

As long as no one set of actors tries to extend its influence at the expense of another, the system of leadership maintains a sort of "knife edge" equilibrium. 

NATO attempts to establish a centralized government in Kabul have clearly failed.  In President Karzai, the West is funding a presidency which is thought by the population and by international observers to not be legitimate.  It is also deeply corrupt.  President Karzai's public rhetoric about jumping directly into the arms of the Taliban are incomprehensible. The normal behavior would be to offer olive branches when funding is being discussed, but surely we have no reason to put any faith in the President's remarks now. 

The problem with Pakistan is something we have written about in this blog for a few years.  Their interests in Afghanistan have never been aligned with ours, and this will never change with the current Pakistani state.  Withdrawing from Afghanistan can reduce the amount of "aid" we need to pump in which is solely to buy support for our Afghan operations. 

One of the sadder comments Coburn makes is to say that no group is held in lower esteem in Afghan society than the cadre of publicity-seeking NGO's. I believe that the Central Asia Institute is an exception to this characterization.  Minnesota native Greg Mortenson's organization has had a tangible effect on helping to educate young women, at the invitation and with the support of local elders.  This kind of grass roots effort, which doesn't aim at reforming cultural norms about gender, religion or criminal punishment, has a chance of succeeding, though it is certainly not without its challenges. 

Let's see what happens with the upcoming international conference on the future of Afghanistan.  We shouldn't expect to hear anything that would undermine the benefits of a withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

 

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